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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/731,274	12/09/2003	Martin Sawicki	60001.287US01	4979
27488	7590	12/14/2006	EXAMINER	
MERCHANT & GOULD (MICROSOFT) P.O. BOX 2903 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402-0903			BOTTS, MICHAEL K	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2176	
DATE MAILED: 12/14/2006				

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary	Application No. 10/731,274	Applicant(s) SAWICKI ET AL.	
	Examiner Michael K. Botts	Art Unit 2176	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 02 October 2006.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-28 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-28 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413) |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) | Paper No(s)/Mail Date: _____ |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08) | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application |
| Paper No(s)/Mail Date: _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

DETAILED ACTION

1. This is a Non-Final Office Action. This action is responsive to the following communication: Amendment, which was filed on October 2, 2006.
2. Claims 1-28 have been examined, with claims 1, 10, and 19 being the independent claims.
3. Claims 19-24 and 26-28 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101. Applicant has appropriately amended the claims. Accordingly, the rejections are withdrawn.
4. A double patenting rejection is made.
5. Claims 1-28 are rejected.

Information Disclosure Statement

6. Applicants filed a document designated as an Information Disclosure Statement on June 13, 2006. The document filed is not in the form of an information disclosure statement, and it does not provide sufficient information for the Examiner to review and consider the information provided. The document presents factual evidence relating to the patentability of the invention without proper affidavit support. Accordingly, the document is acknowledged as having been received, but it has not been considered by the Examiner.

The Specification

7. Applicant is reminded of the requirement to update the status (pending, allowed, etc.) of all parent priority applications in the first line of the specification, when

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appropriate, and the status of all citations of U.S. filed applications in the specification should also be updated, when appropriate.

8. The lengthy specification has not been checked to the extent necessary to determine the presence of all possible minor errors. Applicant's cooperation is requested in correcting any errors of which applicant may become aware in the specification.

Double Patenting Rejection

9. Claims 1, 10, and 19 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1, 12, and 23 of co-pending U.S. Patent Application No. 10/730,530; claims 1, 11, and 19 of co-pending U.S. Patent Application No. 10/730,301; claims 1, 8, and 15 of co-pending U.S. Patent Application No. 10/727,299; and, claims 1, 9, and 15 of co-pending U.S. Patent Application No. 10/726,954. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other.

This is a provisional obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

10. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory

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obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Omum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with this application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement.

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

"A later patent claim is not patentably distinct from an earlier patent claim if the later claim is obvious over, or anticipated by, the earlier claim. *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 896, 225 USPQ 645, 651 (affirming a holding of obviousness-type double patenting because the claims at issue were obvious over claims in four prior patents); *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 1437, 46 USPQ2d 1226, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming a

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holding of obviousness-type double patenting where a patent application claim to a genus is anticipated by a patent claim to a species within that genus). *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.*, 251 F.3d 955, 58 USPQ2d 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (decided *en banc*). See also, *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993), stating, as follows: “Claim 12 and 13 are generic to the species of the invention covered by claim 3 of this patent. Thus, the generic invention is “**anticipated**” by the species of the patented invention. Cf., *Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner*, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that an earlier species disclosure in the prior art defeats any generic claim.) This court’s predecessor has held that, without a terminal disclaimer, the species claims preclude issuance of the generic application. *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 944, 214 USPQ 761, 767 (CCPA 1982); *Schneller*, 397 F.2d at 354. Accordingly, absent a terminal disclaimer, claims 12 and 13 were properly rejected under the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.”

Claims Rejections – 35 U.S.C. 101

35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

11. **Claims 1-6, and 9** are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. Independent claim 1 currently recites computer-executable components on a computer storage medium that are “arranged to . . .” Claims 2-6 and 9 inherit the rejection of claim 1 through their

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dependency on claim 1, and claims 2-6 and 9 do not remedy the grounds for the rejection. The claims lack the necessary physical articles or objects to constitute a machine or a manufacture within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 101. They are clearly not a series of steps or acts to be a process, nor are they a combination of chemical compounds to be a composition of matter. As such, they fail to fall within a statutory category. They are, at best, functional descriptive material per se.

12. In the interest of compact prosecution, the application is further examined against the prior art, as stated below, upon the assumption that the applicants may overcome the above stated rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101.

Claims Rejections – 35 U.S.C. 102

The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.

13. Claims 1, 6-10, 15-19, and 25-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being clearly anticipated by DeRose, et al. (U.S. Patent 5,557,722, issued September 17, 1996) [hereinafter "DeRose"].

Regarding independent claim 1, as amended, DeRose teaches:

A computer storage medium having computer-executable components, comprising:

a first component that is arranged to edit an electronic document having editable objects;

(See, DeRose, col. 7, line 15 through col. 30, line 18, teaching editing electronic documents.)

a second component that is arranged to define a first location for the start of an editable object region for which a level of editing permission for a specific user is desired and to define a second location for the end of the editable object region;

(See, DeRose, col. 7, line 15 through col. 12, line 9, teaching a first location ("start tags") for an object region ("text chunks."). See also, DeRose, col. 8, line 61 through col. 9, line 9, teaching editing permission as "security for the document.")

a third component that is arranged to associate a user identifier for the specific user with the text region that is defined by the first and second locations;

(See, DeRose, col. 12, line 10 through col. 13, line 16, teaching a second location ("end tags") for the text region ("text chunks"). DeRose teaches a style sheet as the third component that associates a user identifier with the text region or text chunk. See, DeRose, col. 19, lines 34-36.)

and a fourth component that is arranged to encode in an ML format in the electronic document, a first element that defines the first location, and a second element that defines the second location, wherein the first or second element

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further comprises the user identifier.

(See, DeRose, col. 7, line 15 through col. 30, line 18, teaching the use of Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML) as the markup language (ML) to encode the electronic document defined by the first and second locations (start and end tags).)

Regarding **dependent claim 6**, DeRose teaches:

The computer-readable medium of Claim 1, wherein the first and second elements are imbedded in the ML-encoded electronic document at the first and second locations respectively.

(See, DeRose, col. 7, line 15 through col. 24, line 51, teaching the first and second elements embodies as "start tags" and "end tags.")

Regarding **dependent claim 7**, DeRose teaches:

The computer-readable medium of Claim 1, further comprising a fifth component that is arranged to output an ML file that comprises the ML-encoded electronic document and the first and second elements.

(See, DeRose, figures 4 and 12-14, and col. 7, lines 15-39, teaching output devices enabled by the invention including display monitors and printers.)

Regarding **dependent claim 8**, DeRose teaches:

The computer-readable medium of Claim 7, wherein the first element and the second element comprise a unique identifier by which the first and the

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second element are associated having a one-to-one correspondence.

(See, DeRose, col. 10, line 57 through col. 11, line 7, teaching tag attributes including corresponding start and end tags and locations. See also, DeRose, col. 9, lines 6-9, teaching tag attributes including security designations.)

Regarding **dependent claim 9**, DeRose teaches:

The computer-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the unique identifier is encoded with a level of editing permission that is to be panted to the specific user identified by the user identifier.

(See, DeRose, col. 9, lines 6-9, teaching tag attributes including security designations.)

Regarding **independent claims 10 and 19, as amended**:

Claims 10 and 19 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 1 and are rejected along the same rationale.

Regarding dependent **claims 15 and 25**:

Claims 15 and 25 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 6 and are rejected along the same rationale.

Regarding dependent **claims 16 and 26**:

Claims 16 and 26 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 7 and are rejected along the same rationale.

Regarding dependent claims 17 and 27:

Claims 17 and 27 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 8 and are rejected along the same rationale.

Regarding dependent claims 18 and 28:

Claims 18 and 28 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 9 and are rejected along the same rationale.

14. It is noted that any citations to specific, pages, columns, lines, or figures in the prior art references and any interpretation of the references should not be considered to be limiting in any way. A reference is relevant for all it contains and may be relied upon for all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having ordinary skill in the art.

See, MPEP 2123.

Claims Rejection – 35 U.S.C. 103

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

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15. Claims 2, 3, 11, 12, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over DeRose as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Ayers, L., "AbiWord's Potential," Linux Gazette, Issue 43, July 1999, downloaded by the Examiner on December 20, 2005, from: www.linuxgazette.com/issue43/ayers.html, downloaded pages 1-4, [hereinafter "Ayers"]].

Regarding **dependent claim 2**, DeRose in view of Ayers teaches:

The computer-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the electronic document is a word-processor document.

(DeRose teaches the limitations of claim 1, but does not expressly teach the use of the invention in a markup language based word processor.

Ayers teaches the XML based word processor "AbiWord."

DeRose and Ayers are combinable because they both involve the same art of markup language manipulation of electronic documents.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to have combined the teachings of DeRose with Ayers for the obvious and beneficial advantage of delimiting sections of text in a word processing environment with access limitations.

The suggestion for doing so would have been from the fact that DeRose recognizes the connection between a word processor for the creation of an electronic document for use with the markup language invention. See, DeRose, col. 8, lines 26-

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37, teaching that the markup language of the invention may use a word processor.

Starting with a word processor to produce the markup language initially is an obvious and logical savings of one step in the invention process.

Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine DeRose with Ayers to obtain the invention as specified in claim 2.

Regarding **dependent claim 3**, DeRose in view of Ayers teaches:

The computer-readable medium of Claim 2, wherein the editable objects comprise one of paragraphs, characters, tables, images, rows, cells, columns, text, and objects native to the application.

(The rejection of claim 2 is incorporated by this reference. In addition, see, DeRose, teaching the editable objects of text, etc. as "text chunks.")

Regarding **dependent claims 11 and 21**:

Claims 11 and 21 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 2 and are rejected along the same rationale.

Regarding **dependent claims 12 and 22**:

Claims 12 and 22 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 3 and are rejected along the same rationale.

Regarding **dependent claim 20**, DeRose in view of Ayers teaches:

The system of claim 19, wherein the electronic document is stored in a proprietary format.

(It is noted that the limitation of storing the electronic document in a "proprietary format" is not expressly defined or taught in the specification, which describes the limitation within the context of an unclaimed "editor process," stating: "The document can be stored in a proprietary format of the editor process." See, disclosure, page 12, lines 4-5.

The claimed limitation term "proprietary format" is read as being consistent with the disclosed term "proprietary format of the editor process." The Examiner understands the claim term to mean that which was known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as "A program owned or copyrighted by an individual or a business and available for use only through purchase or by permission of the owner." See, "Microsoft Computer Dictionary," Fifth Edition, Microsoft Press, 2002, definition of "proprietary software." The claim limitation "proprietary format" will be defined as stated above for the remainder of this Office Action.

The Examiner takes official notice of the fact that electronic documents, including markup language electronic documents, were, at the time of the invention, stored within programs of a proprietary format, such as within commercially available programs. An example of such commercial proprietary software program being AbiWord, as described and discussed in Ayers. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to store the electronic document within a commercially available proprietary software format, for the purposes of ordinary document storage,

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later retrieval, sale, distribution, transportation, etc.

16. Claims 4, 5, 13, 14, 23, and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over DeRose as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Takata, et al. (U.S. Patent 6,119,136, issued September 12, 2000) [hereinafter "Takata"].

Regarding **dependent claim 4**, DeRose in view of Takata teaches:

The computer-readable medium of Claim 1, wherein the electronic document is a spreadsheet document.

(DeRose teaches the limitations of claim 1, but does not expressly teach the use of the invention in a spreadsheet document.

Takata teaches the use of a spreadsheet for creating a markup language (HTML) document.

DeRose and Takata are combinable because they both involve the same art of markup language manipulation of electronic documents.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to have combined the teachings of DeRose with Takata for the obvious and beneficial advantage of delimiting sections of an electronic document with access limitations.

The suggestion for doing so would have been from the fact that DeRose recognizes the connection between a word processor for the creation of an electronic

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document for use with the markup language invention. See, DeRose, col. 8, lines 26-37, teaching that the markup language of the invention may use a text editor. Takata teaches the use of a spreadsheet as a text editor. See, Takata, col. 1, line 66 through col. 4, line 37.

Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine DeRose with Takata to obtain the invention as specified in claim 4.

Regarding **dependent claim 5**, DeRose in view of Takata teaches:

The computer-readable medium of claim 4, wherein the editable objects are cells.

(The rejection of claim 4 is incorporated by this reference. In addition, see, Takata, col. 1, line 66 through col. 3, line 45.)

Regarding **dependent claims 13 and 23**:

Claims 13 and 23 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 4 and are rejected along the same rationale.

Regarding **dependent claims 14 and 24**:

Claims 11 and 21 incorporate substantially similar subject matter as claimed in claim 5 and are rejected along the same rationale.

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17. It is noted that any citations to specific, pages, columns, lines, or figures in the prior art references and any interpretation of the references should not be considered to be limiting in any way. A reference is relevant for all it contains and may be relied upon for all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having ordinary skill in the art.

See, MPEP 2123.

Response to Arguments

Applicants' arguments filed October 2, 2006 have been fully considered, but they are not persuasive.

Regarding rejections of claims 1-6 and 9, under 35 U.S.C 101:

FIRST: Applicants argue that the claims language is proper, stating:

"Beauregard-type claims are clearly patentable subject matter." See, Amendment, page 6.

The Examiner disagrees.

The only reference to "Beauregard-type claims" known by the Examiner is that discussed in MPEP 2111.01.III., discussing the plain meaning of claims terminology, which does not appear to be relevant to the rejection.

SECOND: Applicants argue that the claims language is proper, stating:

"Examination guidelines for patentable subject matter describe 'functional descriptive material' consisting of data structures and compute programs which impart functionality when employed as a computer component." See, Amendment, page 6.

The Examiner disagrees.

It is admitted that functional descriptive material may be statutory. However, what is missing in claims 1-6 and 9 is a functionality. The claims are drawn to the software itself, which is non-statutory, rather than to "imparting functionality when employed as a computer component."

THIRD: Applicants argue that the claims language is proper, stating: "In determining whether the claim is for a 'practical application,' the focus is not on whether the steps taken to achieve a particular result are useful, tangible and concrete, but whether the final result is 'useful, tangible and concrete.'" See, Amendment, page 6.

The Examiner disagrees.

The omission in the claims that makes the claims non-statutory is that the software alone is claimed and there is no particular result or implementation claimed. It is suggested that the claims may be made statutory by incorporating one or more of the following elements: 1) The manipulation of data that represents a physical object or activity transformed from outside the computer. See, MPEP 2106 IV.B.2(b)(i). 2) A recitation of a physical transformation outside the computer, for example in the form of pre or post computer processing activity. See, MPEP 2106 IV.B.2(b)(i). Or, 3) A direct recitation of a practical application in the technological arts. See, MPEP 2106 IV.B.2(b)(ii).

Regarding rejections of claims 1, 6-10, 15-19, and 25-28:

FIRST: Applicants argue that the citation to the reference, DeRose, in the

rejection is not sufficiently specific. See, Amendment, page 7.

The Examiner disagrees.

The reference pervasively teaches the elements of the claims. For example, the claim limitation of "a first component that is arranged to edit an electronic document having editable objects" as in claim 1, is taught throughout DeRose. The Examiner further notes that contrary to Applicant's argument, the rejections do not solely cite to the breadth of DeRose. As cited above, and in the Non-Final Office Action filed May 1, 2006, many specific citations to the reference are made where the claim limitations are specific enough to be addressed by brief references.

SECOND: Applicants object to the citation to SGML to encode start and end tags throughout DeRose. See, Amendment, page 7.

The Examiner notes that the discussion of the creation and use of the SGML tags extends the length of the DeRose and, therefore, the citation is appropriate for the level of detail with which the limitation is claimed.

Regarding rejection of claims 1, 10, and 19:

FIRST: Applicants argue that that "DeRose fails to disclose or suggest 'a second component that is arranged to define a first location for the start of an editable object region for which a level of editing permission for a specific user is desired and to define a second location for the end of the editable object region.' In particular, DeRose fails to disclose that the tags in the descriptive markup (in an editable object region) can include attributes for requiring 'a level of editing permission for a specific user.'"

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Applicant further argues: "Thus the disclosure in DeRose regarding tags for document does not teach or suggest implementing different levels of editing permission, but merely teaches how to display the tagged items in a previously existing SGML document." See, Amendment, pages 8-9.

The Examiner disagrees.

See, DeRose, col. 8, lines 32-33, teaching that documents in SGML may be created using standard text editors. See also, DeRose, col. 8, line 61 through col. 9, line 9, teaching tags that may be used, including a start tag for security. Therefore, DeRose teaches creating SGML secure text blocks as well as reading them. The establishment of even one secure block of data inherently establishes at least two levels of security, one level for those who can access the secured material and a second level for those who cannot access the material.

SECOND: Applicants argue that "DeRose fails to disclose 'a user identifier for the specific user' to be associated with the editable object region." See, Amendment, pages 8-9.

The Examiner disagrees.

The claim, claim 1, specifies "a third component that is arranged to associate a user identifier for the specific user with the text region that is defined by the first and second locations."

DeRose teaches a style sheet as the third component that associates a user identifier with the text region or text chunk. See, DeRose, col. 19, lines 34-36.

Regarding rejection of claims 2, 3, 11, 12, 21, and 22:

Applicants argue that the references, DeRose in view of Ayers, fails to teach or suggest "a level of editing permission for a specific user to edit a region that is defined by the first and second locations; or a user identifier for the specific user associated with the defined region." See, Amendment, page 10.

The Examiner disagrees.

See, DeRose, col. 8, lines 32-33, teaching that documents in SGML may be created using standard text editors. See also, DeRose, col. 8, line 61 through col. 9, line 9, teaching tags that may be used, including a start tag for security. Therefore, DeRose teaches creating SGML secure text blocks as well as reading them. The establishment of even one secure block of data inherently establishes at least two levels of security, one level for those who can access the secured material and a second level for those who cannot access the material.

Also, DeRose teaches a style sheet as the third component that associates a user identifier with the text region or text chunk. See, DeRose, col. 19, lines 34-36.

Regarding rejections of claims 4, 5, 13, 14, 23, and 24:

Applicants argue that the references, DeRose in view of Takata, fails to teach or suggest "a level of editing permission for a specific user to edit a region that is defined by the first and second locations; or a user identifier for the specific user associated with the defined region." See, Amendment, pages 10-11.

The Examiner disagrees.

See, DeRose, col. 8, lines 32-33, teaching that documents in SGML may be created using standard text editors. See also, DeRose, col. 8, line 61 through col. 9, line 9, teaching tags that may be used, including a start tag for security. Therefore, DeRose teaches creating SGML secure text blocks as well as reading them. The establishment of even one secure block of data inherently establishes at least two levels of security, one level for those who can access the secured material and a second level for those who cannot access the material.

Also, DeRose teaches a style sheet as the third component that associates a user identifier with the text region or text chunk. See, DeRose, col. 19, lines 34-36.

Conclusion

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Michael K. Botts whose telephone number is 571-272-5533. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday through Friday 8:00-4:00 EST.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Heather Herndon can be reached on 571-272-4136. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only.

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For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

MKB/mkb


Heather R. Herndon
Supervisory Patent Examiner
Technology Center 2100